Abstract: Although there are numerous guides available for establishing a computer security incident response capability, there appears to be no underlying management model that brings them all together. This paper aims to address the problem by developing a management model for establishing a Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT). A design science-based approach has been selected for the overall project. However, the current paper reports on the first three activities in design science research: identifying the problem, listing solution objectives, and designing and developing a model. A comprehensive literature review serves two purposes: to confirm the problem and to provide a structured way of revealing the requirement areas. Following the uncovering of the requirement areas, CSIRT business requirements and services are introduced, before exploring the relationships between the areas using argumentation. This culminates in the development of the management model in two parts: a strategic view and a tactical view. The strategic view comprises the business requirements and "higher" level decisions -the environment, constituency and funding considerations -that need to be made when establishing a CSIRT. The tactical view follows by presenting the "how" considerations. Together, these two views provide an holistic model for establishing a CSIRT by parties interested in doing so.
INTRODUCTION
The concept of a CERT R or Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) is well known in the information security domain. It has recently received renewed interest for novel areas of application like cloud computing (with its unique information security challenges) [1] and in developing countries [2, 3] catching up with the Internet bandwagon.
Popular IT news sites [4, 5] , security-related conferences [6, 7] and talks of global cyber-war [8, 9] evidence the reality of the information security landscape today. A year of particular significance was 2014 with Distributed Reflective Denial of Service (DRDoS) attacks on the rise (and ongoing in 2015) [10] , followed by the revealing of critical vulnerabilities in core libraries of systems connected to the Internet.
Names like "Heartbleed" (OpenSSL vulnerability) and "Shellshock" (Bash vulnerability) together with the exploitation of these vulnerabilities [11, 12] show just how fragile this ecosystem really is. In addition, the increasing hype over big data breaches [13, 14] has alerted those without an information security team to the fact that establishing one is inevitable.
So, how do we respond and what steps are required to reach the goal of being a less attractive target? The primary mechanism adopted by the Internet community to recognise and deal with incidents like hacking, malware outbreaks and denial of service attacks is the establishment of an incident response capability [15, p. 1] in the form of a team responsible for incident handling. There are various options for this capability ranging from an ad-hoc (informal) approach to dedicated CSIRTs [15, 16] . These include transitional or special-purpose models like Warning, Advice and Reporting Points (WARPs) [17] , and Community-orientated Security, Advisory and Warning (C-SAW) teams [18] . These models are typically less formal and offer a subset of traditional CSIRT services. Therefore, as the most complete/mature and formal capability, this research will focus on the establishment of a Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT), which is "an organization or team that provides services and support to a defined constituency for preventing, handling, and responding to computer security incidents" [19, p. 1] .
The resulting management model is also useful to other types of teams though, as the broad areas of consideration are still applicable.
RESEARCH PROBLEM AND OBJECTIVES
There are a plethora of guidelines and processes to follow when setting out to establish a CSIRT and where to start is not clear. Plentiful advice is provided regarding which aspects to consider, without a consistent method or process to follow and thereby ensure that the most important of these "requirements" for establishing a CSIRT are catered for. A similar view is shared by [1] which highlights the lack of consistency in incident management literature. Therefore, the problem addressed by this paper is the lack of a clear, holistic method to follow when setting out to establish a CSIRT. Solving this problem is important as we then have a means of knowing where and how to start when building a CSIRT. This will ultimately result in a prepared, improved and coordinated response to IT security incidents.
Successfully providing CSIRT services requires an holistic approach. "Policies, procedures, equipment, premises, contacts, and staff should be established before commencing operations" [20, p. 32] although it is likely that many of these items will be missing or inadequate [20] . To ensure that nothing is omitted, a structure based on the IT Infrastructure Library (ITIL) management framework is proposed in the following section.
The objectives of this paper are therefore to 1. analyse existing CSIRT literature, with the purpose of identifying the primary areas of requirements for building a CSIRT, and 2. develop a management model based on the associations revealed between these areas.
To facilitate application and readability, the management model is presented in two views: a strategic view (section 5) and a tactical view (section 6). Together, these views can be used as a framework for the task of establishing a CSIRT.
As the methodology used to achieve these objectives, the next section will explain the Design Science Research (DSR)-based approach and comprehensive literature survey employed to develop the model.
METHODOLOGY
The primary technique used for this study is Design Science Research (DSR). Design science "attempts to create things that serve human purposes" [21, p. 253].
Design Science Research overview
Design science has been defined as creating and evaluating artefacts "intended to solve identified organisational problems" [22, p. 77 A DSR process was used to create an effective artefact, a model in this instance, through the application of knowledge [21, p. 253] . This knowledge was obtained via a comprehensive study of the relevant literature utilising a concept matrix for categorisation [23] . This process and the literature study are presented in the following sections.
A process for DSR
A process for executing and presenting design science research has been developed by [24] . The process consists of the six activities listed and described in table 1.
In section 2 the problem was defined and solution objectives were listed. The rest of this section will present the conceptual framework for the actual model development, describe the literature sources, and finally reveal a concept matrix of the literature. The remaining sections are therefore focused on activity three -the development of the management model -as a DSR artefact.
The demonstration and evaluation steps have been identified as not feasible for this paper due to space and time constraints. The current paper therefore only reports on the first three steps of the DSR process.
Conceptual framework for the management model
Considering that a CSIRT can be seen as a team providing specialised IT services to a defined constituency [25] , the IT Infrastructure Library (ITIL R ) as a framework for IT service management, is certainly applicable. • people -the staff and management of the CSIRT;
• processes -CSIRT policies and procedures;
• products -customer-facing services, technologies and tools; and
• partners -internal (those present in the same host organisation/ business e.g. human resources or public relations) and external (vendors, suppliers, other CSIRT teams, media, law enforcement, service providers, etc.).
To complete the picture, the constituency, or customer base [16] , of the CSIRT (as the consumer of the services provided) must be included.
How the CSIRT (represented through the four Ps) and the constituency fit together is shown in fig. 1 . Partners may form part of the CSIRT depending on whether or not they assist directly with provisioning the CSIRT services (e.g as expert consultants, help desk staff, etc.).
ITIL's management framework: ITIL advises that the four Ps need to be aligned with the business and therefore proposes "five areas that need to be considered with regard to the design of a management architecture" [26, Therefore, in order to provide structure to the CSIRT establishment model, the framework was adapted to include the CSIRT Partners and Services as shown in fig. 2 . These two areas are developed iteratively as we progress through the other requirement areas and therefore they encompass the non-business requirements.
In the following section the approach used for the literature survey is presented, as a means of extracting the relevant information from the knowledge base.
Primary literature sources
A comprehensive search was performed with the objective of determining the primary sources of literature relevant to CSIRT establishment. The search concepts were therefore selected as 1. CSIRT or CERT ("incident response team", "computer emergency response/readiness team") and 2. establish (create, start, found).
Searches were conducted on ScienceDirect, Scopus, SpringerLink and IEEEXplore using these terms. To ensure that no important publications were missed, Google Scholar was searched using the terms CSIRT OR CERT OR "Incident Response Team" OR "Computer Emergency Response Team" establish.
To reduce the volume of returned publications, the results were filtered for relevance based on the title followed by the abstract or summary text.
Then, as recommended by [23] , the processes of going backwards and forwards through citations was utilised to ensure that the final set was as complete as possible. When no significant new concepts emerged, the primary source of each concept was identified and the search terminated [23, p. xvi] .
Reading through the material revealed a pattern of authoritative sources from respected authors. It was found that the main institutions affiliated with these sources include the Software Engineering Institute of Carnegie Mellon University (CMU-SEI) [15, 19, 25, 27] (who established the first CERT in 1988 * ) and the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) [16, 28] . Other contributors include the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [29] ; the Australian Computer Emergency Response Team (AusCERT) [20] ; the University of Auckland (AUCK) with Sun Microsystems (SUN) [30] ; and the SysAdmin, Audit, Networking and Security (SANS) Institute [31] . Finally, the Portuguese National (CERT.PT) and academic -Fundação para a Computação Científica Nacional (FCCN) -CSIRTs contributed to the technical requirements [32] .
The most relevant publications from these institutions were selected as the primary sources for this study * * .
Summary of the primary sources
This section summarises these primary sources grouped by institution and ordered by the number of sources from each.
Handbook for Computer Security Incident Response
Teams (CSIRTs) [25] (CMU-SEI): Providing guidance on building and running a CSIRT, this handbook has a particular focus on the incident handling service [25, p. xv] . In addition, a basic CSIRT framework is provided covering the mission, constituency, organisational placing and relationships of the CSIRT to other teams. Detailed descriptions of CSIRT services, policies and team operations (including staffing issues) are supplied.
Organizational models for Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs) [15] (CMU-SEI):
This handbook provides guidance on selecting the correct model for an organisation's incident response capabilities. The primary focus is on the organisational model and operational structure of the team. Common CSIRT models with their attributes, respective advantages and disadvantages, as well as typical service offerings are discussed.
State of the practice of Computer Security Incident * see http://www.cert.org/about/ * * Although some of these references appear dated, recent publications confirm that there have been no relevant updates [33, p. 4] and very few related publications in general since 2009 [1] . This is partly due to the fact that CSIRTs have been evolving since 1988 and are mature in developed countries [34] . The foundations of these publications are still applicable though and provide good academic value particularly due to the authoritative nature of the sources.
Response Teams (CSIRTs) [27] (CMU-SEI):
A comprehensive survey forms the basis of this technical report intended to present the status quo of CSIRTs across the globe [27, p. xii] . A summary of what CSIRTs require in order to be effective is provided. This is complemented by a literature review, which includes a basic framework of areas and factors to consider when developing an incident response capability [27, p. 84 ]. This information is useful to both new and existing CSIRTs.
Defining incident management processes for CSIRTs: A work in progress [19] (CMU-SEI):
This report takes a process-centric approach to identifying the resources and roles required for incident management. The process definitions are accompanied by workflow diagrams and descriptions. The resulting process maps provide a best-practice model outlining the requirements for a successful incident management capability in terms of the primary functions and tasks [19, p. 8] .
A step-by-step approach on how to set up a CSIRT [16] (ENISA): This document, provided by the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA), covers business management, processes and technical aspects of CSIRT establishment. It provides a definition of a CSIRT, a description of services that can be provided as well as a process to follow for getting started [16, p. 4] . [28] (ENISA): Also by ENISA, this more recent guide provides practical information and good practices for managing network and information security incidents. This handbook is especially useful to developing CSIRTs in the establishment phase as it contains guidelines on structuring incident management and, in particular, the incident handling service [28, p. 4] .
Good practice guide for incident management

Computer security incident handling guide [29] (NIST):
This guide from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) provides recommendations for establishing a successful incident response capability. Incident handling in general is also featured with the primary focus on detecting, analysing, prioritising and handling incidents.
Forming an incident response team [20] (AusCERT):
Based on the experience of building the Australian Security Emergency Response Team (SERT), this paper looks at what it takes to form and maintain an incident response team. Topics include the constituency, policies, information, equipment and tools, as well as partner relationships and interactions [20, p. 1] .
Expectations for computer security incident response [30] (AUCK, SUN): This best current practice Request for Comments (RFC) provides a general framework of what can reasonably be expected of a CSIRT and the important subjects that are of concern to the community. A template for CSIRTs is provided as an aid for implementing and communicating the recommendations. Although quite dated, it is still used as the basis for defining many CSIRTs CMU-SEI [27] CMU-SEI [25] CMU-SEI [15] ENISA [16] CMU-SEI [19] AusCERT [20] NIST [29] AUCK, SUN [30] SANS Institute [31] CERT.PT, FCCN [32] = minimal information or reference only; = useful information; = primary source as evidenced by googling cert OR csirt rfc 2350 * * * .
Computer security incident handling [31] (SANS Institute):
This step-by-step publication presents an "action plan for dealing with intrusions, cyber-theft, and other security-related events" [31, p. i]. It reflects the experience of incident handlers from over 50 commercial, government and educational organisations [31, p. iii] and is specifically intended to provide a starting point for incident handling procedures. An "emergency action card" is provided for organisations that are not prepared for when an IT security incident occurs [31, p. x] .
Technical infrastructure of a CSIRT [32] (CERT.PT / FCCN):
The goal of this paper is to provide a guide for building the technical infrastructure required by a CSIRT, with an emphasis on the necessary tools, equipment and mechanisms. The technical infrastructure of the Portuguese NREN CSIRT is used as an operational example.
It is important to observe that although there are only a few primary sources here, the volume of material is quite large as these articles and reports range from 6 [32] to 291 [27] pages with an average of 123 pages between them (total 1351 pages). As a result, a method to make the data more coherent and useful was required. The framework conferred in section 3.3 was used to organise the literature and produce a concept matrix. This concept matrix is presented, together with a brief summary of the contribution areas for each source, in the next section. * * * Examples of the use of RFC2350 include: http://www.renisac.net/csirt/ and https://www.cert.at/about/rfc2350/ rfc2350_en.html
Concept matrix
The previous two sections were brought together through the use of a concept matrix to synthesise the literature (as recommended by [23] ). The concepts (or topics) emerged while reading the literature as natural groupings of CSIRT requirements and matched up well with the ITIL framework. This resulting matrix is shown in table 2.
The number of ticks in the table shows the perceived strength/influence of the resource, that is, how much it has to say on a topic as reflected in the following sections. Primary sources for the respective requirement areas are shown using triple ticks (). More detailed concept matrices were developed for each area but these are excluded as they are not core to this research.
As seen in the table, [19] , with their process-centric focus, emerged as a primary reference for people and processes. The ENISA guides provided the strongest contributions to the business requirements and also provided significant inputs to policies and processes. Respectively, people [16] , and tools and technologies [28] , also came out strong. The focus on organisational models is apparent with [15] shown as a primary source for the people-related requirements. This is complemented by detailed service descriptions, including applicable and appropriate services for each model, and hence the emergence of [15] as a primary reference for services. The strengths are broader for [27] , as can be expected from a state of the practice survey and general discussion on CSIRTs. The handbook from [25] is similarly diverse with strengths in multiple categories. Although broad strengths would be expected from [20] (considering the title and topics of the paper) it appears to be stronger in policies and processes than the other categories. Lastly, [32] is clearly focused on tools and technologies, in line with the goal of the paper.
BACKGROUND
In order to commence the management model definition, some constructs needed to be defined. This section therefore introduces the CSIRT business requirements and services.
Business requirements
As the logical entry point for developing a CSIRT management model, the primary business requirements (or organisational inputs) that need to be considered when establishing a CSIRT are described in this section. These business requirements, i.e. the objectives within the organisation [26, p. 61] , are those requirements and decisions needed prior to building a CSIRT.
The following sub-areas of business requirements have been identified [35] :
• environment,
• constituency,
• authority,
• funding, and
• legal considerations.
These are discussed individually in the remainder of this section.
Environment: Determining the environment is the first step in establishing a CSIRT. The CSIRT environment can be defined by the sector which will be served by the CSIRT, the geographic region of operations and the organisational structure of the host institution (if applicable) [29, p. 47] . To determine the environment, it was argued that the following questions need to be answered [35] :
The choices for type and/or sector include [15, p. 3] : national, academic, CIP/CIIP, government, military, SME, commercial, internal, vendor and other CSIRTs. It is important to understand where the CSIRT fits into the national hierarchy and identify the sector early on so that contact can be made with potential partners and coordinators. Answering this question alludes to suitable funding models. A commercial CSIRT typically charges for CSIRT services utilising membership fees and/or paid for services, while an internal CSIRT is typically funded by the host organisation. In addition, different types of CSIRTs will have different service priorities: e.g. a banking sector CSIRT will be more concerned with protecting credit card information and online banking security, whereas an academic sector CSIRT will be more concerned with protecting student records and intellectual property theft.
What geographic area will be covered by the CSIRT?
A global or regional CSIRT has very different implications on the constituency and services, for example, than an internal CSIRT for a single site. These include time-zones (hours of operation), languages, viable services and other issues. In addition, a CSIRT can span single or multiple cities, provinces or even countries. The geographic area has a significant influence on the team model selection.
3. Which organisational model(s) will the CSIRT use?
The following four organisational models were highlighted in [35] as the primary choices:
• independent,
• embedded,
• campus, and
Answering these questions provides a mission for the CSIRT and subsequently reveals the constituency. The environment additionally scopes the legal considerations by revealing applicable laws and regulations. The answers also partly determine the team model and services provided by the CSIRT. Finally, the mission and goals of the CSIRT are important inputs to policies and processes. More information on the environmental considerations and decisions is available in [35] .
Constituency:
The constituency is the customer base of the CSIRT, that is, the people and organisations receiving CSIRT services. Following the definition of the environment, the constituency is usually defined by IP address range, domain name, autonomous system number(s), and/or free text [28, p. 14] .
Together with the environment, the constituency influences the services that will be provided by the CSIRT. Their needs, skills, expertise, etc. all have an effect. The constituency also provides insight into the type of systems and network(s) the CSIRT needs to support as well as possible funding models.
The team model additionally depends on the accessibility of skilled experts from the constituency, and/or partners, who can extend the team.
Furthermore, required communication mechanisms (tools and technologies) are determined by the needs of the constituency.
Authority:
The nature of the constituency determines the type of authority which the CSIRT may have and exercise. Once the type of authority -full, shared, indirect or none -has been determined, it needs to be communicated back to the constituency. CSIRT management staff must support the authority relationship. In addition, authority affects the services which can be provided by the CSIRT. For example, it is not possible to provision some CSIRT services, e.g. incident tracing and intrusion detection, without some level of authority [20, p. 9]. Funding: Equipping a CSIRT requires resources -both people and technical infrastructure. Equipment, salaries and other operational expenses need to be budgeted for when establishing a CSIRT. Revenue can come from existing resources, membership fees, project subsidy and/or per-use charge for services rendered [16, p. 19] . It has been illustrated that a voluntary approach is possible without funding but this can have serious consequences on the performance and effectiveness of the CSIRT [35] .
Clearly, income relies on the environment as well as the nature of the constituency (e.g. whether they would be willing to pay for CSIRT services). The main contributors to CSIRT expenses are the hours of operation and staff salaries [16, p. 18] . Conversely, the available budget determines how many people can be employed (and at which skill level). Thus, the people (team model and staffing) decisions go hand-in-hand with funding, determining the primary costs. Funding also influences the equipment that can be obtained by the CSIRT.
Legal considerations: The CSIRT should be sensitive to relevant local laws and regulations as well as at least an awareness of laws in other countries [28] . The specific laws relevant to the CSIRT will depend on the CSIRT environment and could include statutory and common or case laws [27, p. 112] . A global CSIRT, for example, requires a different understanding of laws and regulations than a CSIRT operating in a single country (though at least an awareness of the most important laws affecting external partners is required). Legal council and law enforcement partners can advise on compliance to these laws or regulations. More information on legal issues related to CSIRTs is available in [25, 
Relationships between the business requirement areas
The relationships uncovered in this section constrained to the sub-areas of the business requirements are depicted in fig. 3 . (The remaining relationships are included in sections 5 and 6.)
Only once these business requirements have been adequately addressed, should one proceed to the next steps in establishing a CSIRT. These include evaluating the CSIRT services, people requirements and potential partners for the CSIRT.
Services
CSIRT services are classified in three broad categories, namely reactive, proactive or security quality management services [15] . Reactive services, as the primary CSIRT activity, involve actions taken to resolve or mitigate incidents as they occur [19] . They are triggered by events or requests requiring a "reaction" and thereby initiating the service process [15, p. 13] .
Proactive services are aimed at preventing incidents from occurring in the first place through securing systems, providing training and education, monitoring and sharing information [19] . That is, the execution of proactive services is intended to directly reduce the number of future IT security incidents by providing related announcements and information for preparing, protecting and securing systems [15, p. 14].
Security quality management services, meeting wider organisational security needs, only indirectly relate to incident handling and may be provided by the CSIRT or another entity in the organisation (structure-dependent) [15, p. 14] .
A commonly accepted list of CSIRT services is provided in table 3. To be effective, services should address a range of reactive and proactive issues [25] . Which of these services will be provided to the constituency as well as the extent of provision, are important considerations when establishing a CSIRT [15, p. 13] . Most CSIRTs do not provide all of these services but rather a subset based on the type of CSIRT and the needs of the constituency [15, p. 14] . Detailed descriptions of these services are beyond the scope of this paper but can be found in [25] and [15] .
In the following sections the relationships between the business requirements, services and four Ps are revealed and combined to form a management model for establishing a CSIRT. For clarity, the model has been divided into two parts, the strategic view and the tactical view.
MODEL DEVELOPMENT -STRATEGIC VIEW
The strategic view is centred around the business requirements -those decisions that need to be made at the "higher" level. This view marks the entry point of the management model, highlighting the initial decisions that must be made when establishing a CSIRT. These are 1. determining the environment, 2. deciding who the constituency of the CSIRT will be, and 3. selecting a suitable funding model.
Only once these decisions are made can the rest of the requirements be met. The connections between the business requirements and the relevant Ps are revealed in this section.
Business requirements and Services relationship
It is evident that the provision of services is dependent on the constituency as well as financial and human resources. Clearly, before services can be defined, an understanding of the needs and expectations of the constituency, as well as the budget, are required. A CSIRT should aim to provide a realistic, high-quality service portfolio by selecting the core services and developing them as the need arises and resources allow [15] . A recommended list of core services for each type of CSIRT as well as guidelines for extending service offerings is provided by [15] .
Business requirements and Partners relationship
Partners are required for collaboration in resolving incidents and sharing information. Access to partners varies greatly based on the CSIRT environment. If the CSIRT is hosted within an established parent organisation there may be multiple internal partners that can assist with CSIRT activities (e.g., legal council, human resources, marketing and finances). An independent CSIRT, on the other hand, may have to establish many more internal capabilities. This can have a significant effect on staffing (see section 6.4). Required external partners are more dependent on the team model and services provided by the CSIRT, as shown in the following sections. Finally, as mentioned in section 4.1, partners can advise on the relevant legal considerations for the CSIRT.
Business requirements and People relationship
With respect to people, the two main areas for consideration are the team model and staff. The primary inputs to these areas are the environment and funding. In addition, it will be shown that access to skilled experts from the constituency can affect required staffing.
The team model is closely linked to the organisational structure and can comprise one or more of the following: central, distributed, coordinating or combined [15] . Staffing decisions, working hours and ultimately the number of required staff members, are based on the business requirements (environment, funding, constituency), the desired services and even partners (accessible external experts) as shown in the previous sections. The budget and staffing go directly hand-in-hand as staff salaries are a significant expense. Funding also needs to be adaptable to changing staff requirements e.g. workload and services demand [20] .
Summary of the strategic view of the management model
The strategic view is shown in fig. 4 . Authority and legal considerations have been included in this view as they can be directly determined from the definitions of the environment and constituency. They complete the business requirements and also have no direct relationship to the requirements of the four Ps in this model. For clarity, the effects of funding on the other areas of requirements, namely, services, people, and tools and technologies, have been included in the strategic view as the material resource for equipping the CSIRT. Besides the influence these other areas have on determining the budget, including them also simplifies the tactical view which is presented next.
MODEL DEVELOPMENT -TACTICAL VIEW
The remaining relationships, those between the four Ps, together with the environment, constituency and services, comprise the tactical view of the management model. This presents the "how" part of establishing a CSIRT and the second level of considerations following the strategic view. In the following subsections, the details of the relationship between the two areas indicated is provided, prior to summarising the connections in the final paragraph of each subsection.
People and Services relationship
CSIRT staff provide defined services to the constituency (the customers of these services) [30] . The size, available expertise and skills of the team [32] (i.e. human resources) influence the quantity, type, depth and quality of services that can be provided [19] .
These services in turn partly determine the technical staff requirements [16] including specialised skills [15, p. 14] . Clearly, without sufficient resources (staff and funding), services cannot be provided [15] . Therefore, People affect the quantity and type of Services that can be provided. The selected Services will, on the other hand, dictate staff requirements.
People and Policies & Processes relationship
Policies and processes are developed and reviewed from time-to-time by people [20] .
In addition, policies and processes should be published, communicated and understood by both the CSIRT and the constituency [20, 25, 29] .
Staff follow processes [28] in order to provide consistent services to the constituency [19] , aligned with expectations set forth in policies [16] . This contributes to building trust between the constituency and the CSIRT [20] .
Policies and their accompanying processes describe the associated roles, responsibility and accountability of the various participants [19, 25, 29] ; covering the "who" aspects of various CSIRT services [36] and thereby formalising the team [15] .
Thus, People develop Processes which formalise the team (including roles and responsibilities).
People and Tools & Technologies relationship
CSIRT staff identify, organise (e.g. configure and maintain) and use technical resources to provide security incident response services [16, 19] . This includes the development and testing of incident handling tools [19] and the receiving of incident reports from the constituency (via phone, fax, email and/or web forms) [16] .
Tools and technologies simplify the work done by incident handlers by automating tasks and subsequently reducing the staff load [20] and risk of human error [25] . These mechanisms can include the pre-processing of information [20] as well as selecting interesting events from logs and security software for human review [29] . Automated tools can help address the vulnerability of CSIRT staff for making mistakes due to the high-stress situations and the associated responsibility of the work they do [25, p. 150] . Furthermore, tracking and ticketing systems facilitate the handover of incident reports to other staff [27] .
Hence, People identify and develop Tools and Technologies which in turn influence the required staff numbers.
People and Partners relationship
People identify and interact with partners in several ways including escalating to them when applicable/appropriate (e.g. law enforcement, other CSIRTs) [28] . Partners also assist CSIRT staff. For example, human resources can deal with people issues [27] and specialists can provide legal advice [19] .
Relationships of trust are required with both internal and external partners [29] to facilitate the exchange of sensitive information [20] . These contacts and relationships should ideally be identified and developed in advance of their possible requirement [25, p. 51] .
CSIRT staff may be required to "coordinate response activities with internal departments and externally with other CSIRTs, law enforcement agencies, and security experts" [27, p. 104] . These partners can also assist in times of crisis [25, p. 51] by relieving the workload and/or providing specialist skills [29] , thereby complementing existing staff and addressing deficiencies [25, 30] .
Supplementary staff can be comprised of people from the host organisation (internal partners), external partners (including service providers) and even the constituency [25, 27] . Internal partners such as technical writers, public affairs officers as well as legal and human resources consultants can support the work of CSIRT staff [15] . Moreover, the organisational help desk can possibly be used as the initial point of contact for incident reporting [31] .
In summary, People identify and coordinate Partners who conversely supplement and advise staff.
Policies & Processes and Services relationship
Policies and processes include an advertised description of services [15] . Policy dictates which services take priority when resources are limited (e.g. incident handling takes precedence over technology watch or awareness building) and can include the relationships of processes to services (e.g. media interaction is related to incident handling) [25] .
Additionally, successful services are based on appropriate policies and procedures [25] ; workflows, for instance, improve the quality and efficiency of services [16] . Thus processes, by their very nature, improve service response. Therefore, Services are based on Policies and Processes which describe said Services. †
Policies & Processes and Tools & Technologies relationship
Policy requires visibility in order to be effective [36] . Technologies, particularly communication mechanisms, make it possible to market and distribute policies and processes to the constituency and other parties the CSIRT may interact with [20] . Tools and technologies are also used to complement processes, for example by automation.
Policies and processes also guide the development of tools and technologies. These include: the design and configuration of automated tools [19] , system management and backup strategies [20] , cryptographic key management † Service selection typically occurs first. That is, services are selected and then the policies and processes are written, providing the service detail and/or description of how it will be provided. [25] , and logging systems [29] . Security policies and best current practices should be followed by CSIRT staff when establishing and managing resources, equipment and infrastructure [19] .
It is observed therefore that Processes guide the development of Tools and Technologies which are subsequently used to communicate the Policies and Processes to the constituency and partners.
Policies & Processes and Partners relationship
CSIRT preparation should include policies and processes (or procedures) for communicating with outside parties (both internal and external partners) [29] . Policies and processes specify cooperation with external parties and include associated expected levels of service [25] . Information sharing, non-disclosure and reporting agreements may be needed for partner interactions [29] . Peering agreements can be established with partners [30] who can even report events that initiate the incident response process (i.e. trigger services) [16] . Policies and Processes thus define the relationship (cooperation agreements, service levels and reporting requirements) with Partners.
The public affairs office, legal department and management should be consulted by the team when establishing policies and processes for information sharing [29] . Public/media relations staff assist in the development of information disclosure and crisis communication policies and processes [27, 28] . In addition, human resources staff are typically involved in disciplinary action taken on employees and the development of associated policies and processes [19, 27] . Strengthening this link, the legal considerations from the business requirements should be included in relevant policies and processes with the assistance of legal experts [27, p. 113 ]. Finally, policies should be shared with other CSIRTs for input based on their experiences [20] .
Thus, Policies and Processes define the relationship with Partners who in turn are consulted for input when developing Policies and Processes.
Services and Tools & Technologies relationship
While most of the services described in section 4.3 utilise technologies in some form, some direct associations have been identified.
These include the obvious technology-related services (e.g. technology watch, configuration and development of security tools, etc.), as well as those described here.
A ticketing system is the preferred mechanism for tracking incidents and announcements [16, 25] . This system can include email/web integration for automatic reporting [28] , information collection and event correlation [25] . A database is additionally useful for storing incident-related data [15, 32] .
Incident reports (as a trigger to the incident handling service) are received from the constituency and partners via phone, fax, email and web forms [16] . Similarly, these technologies are used to provide incident response and coordination services [27] . Communication technologies are further required for security-related education, awareness and technology watch services [15, 29] .
Hence, Services determine the Tools and Technologies which are required for providing said services.
Partners and Tools & Technologies relationship
Technologies are used to coordinate and aid interactions with partners (including other teams) and outside parties (including victims) [16] . These include communication mechanisms (web forms, email, etc.) [29] , data sharing tools [19] and unique ticket numbers issued by tracking systems [30] . Cooperation and coordination is facilitated by trusted communication and information distribution channels [19, 28] .
Partners in turn can assist with providing or recommending CSIRT tools and technologies via mechanisms such as the ENISA Clearinghouse for Incident Handling Tools (CHIHT) † † . They can also be approached to assist with analysis and testing if the CSIRT does not have access to the required equipment or technologies [15] thereby addressing CSIRT technical deficiencies.
So we see that Tools and Technologies enable Partner interactions and coordination, while Partners can supplement Tools and Technologies.
Partners and Services relationship
Partners may participate in or collaborate in providing services. To illustrate, external experts can be called upon for assistance during incident response to provide specialised platform or operating system support [15] . Sharing the analysis process with other expert groups is desirable in order to learn from them (gain from their knowledge and mutually enhance human capital development) [25] .
The selected CSIRT services influence required partnerships [25] . Firstly, service functions can be triggered by the CSIRT itself, constituents or other parties (including partners) [25] . Secondly, collaboration with trusted partners can expedite the response process, thereby enhancing service delivery [29] . Finally, incident response coordination involves the facilitation of interactions between involved parties [15] .
Therefore, Partners provide skills and expertise to Services, while the choice of Services influences the required Partner relationships. † † https://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/cert/support/ chiht
Summary of the tactical view of the management model
The tactical view, showing the second level of relationships, can be seen in fig. 5 . This view is used once the initial decisions of the strategic view have been considered. Furthermore, it is well aligned with the observation that at a tactical level, security is a combination of people, processes and technologies [37] .
As an entry point, the nature of the environment and the constituency is used for inputs to the people, processes, services, and tools and technologies areas. A number of inter-relationships can be observed between the remaining areas, revealing that there is no specific order to the tactical requirements, but rather that they need to be considered iteratively and in parallel. For example, as the team model and staffing (people) decisions are made, their effect on services, policies and processes, tools and technologies, as well as partners needs to be considered. The inverse also applies: e.g. as services are defined and developed, their impact on the staffing requirements needs to be recognised.
Therefore, to read the management model, each area is highlighted and as the decisions for that area are evaluated, the inputs from the related areas according to the indicated relationships need to be considered. When selecting or developing tools and technologies for example, the following inputs must be considered:
• relevant policies and processes for development need to be consulted (or established);
• team members will perform the actual identification and development of these tools and technologies;
• the selected services as well as the needs of the constituency will determine which tools and technologies are required; and lastly,
• partners can supplement tools and technologies by negating the need for re-development and/or assisting with customisation.
When establishing a CSIRT, both the strategic and tactical views must be considered together to complete the model.
CONCLUSION
This paper combined the requirements and relationships uncovered from authoritative CSIRT literature to form a management model for establishing a CSIRT. The initial steps in the design science research process, i.e. defining the problem, listing the solution objectives and designing and developing a solution artefact, were executed for this research.
The problem of having no consistent method or process to follow when establishing a CSIRT was addressed by combining the literature findings to form a coherent model. A comprehensive literature survey and concept When applying the model, the business requirements need to be addressed first. These include determining: the environment, constituency, authority, funding and legal considerations applicable to the CSIRT. Following that, the tactical view can be followed to implement the CSIRT. This includes services and partner decisions together with the people, policies and processes, and tools and technologies.
The management model is beneficial as a basis for anyone wanting to establish a CSIRT. It addresses the deficiency of a standard model for CSIRT development, enabling one to know where and how to start when building a CSIRT, and ensuring that all important factors are considered. Utilising the model therefore enables an holistic view, providing direction as well as reassurance that nothing is overlooked during the establishment process.
Areas of future research include demonstration and evaluation of the model (possibly with case studies), as well as further elaboration on the decisions required for each area of the model. This will facilitate further development of the management model into a method or process for CSIRT establishment [21, p. 257] .
